

May - 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/P

SUBJECT: Deception Activities to Strengthen PBSUCCESS cover.

REFERENCE: Memo from DD/P to C/P, dated 28 April 1954, subject "Ways and Means of Improving Cover and Deception for PBSUCCESS Operation"

1. Attached draft of a letter "To Whom It May Concern" could be signed by either [] or by CALLIGERIS or by both; in the latter case, it might be preferable to present each with a slightly different version of the text -- or would there be any merit in having one add the same letter signed by both?

2. There appear to be three basic methods of making that letter:

- a) Impress the underlying story so strongly upon CALLIGERIS and/or [] that they will either discuss it with a number of people or start on their part to solicit funds of other support, as suggested in reference memo;
- b) Actually use the letter to solicit support, possibly through AVILA who best is a busybody who will presumably talk to too many people and at worst might be a double agent (I have no proof of that, but somebody so anxious to perform sensitive duties should always be considered as a potential enemy agent, at least until the contrary has been proven) -- see also [] recommendations;
- c) Plant or "lose" the letter in such a way that it is most likely either be reported directly to the enemy or to appear in the press.

There seems to be no cogent reason why we could not use two or all three of these methods simultaneously, to achieve a higher probability of success.

3. Method "a" above is discussed with sufficient detail in reference memo and does not present special difficulties nor require particular preparations -- apart from executing the draft of the attached letter. There are, however, two questions to be resolved concerning the approach to CALLIGERIS and [] as suggested in reference memo: (a) it seems that we have told both thus far that there won't be any difficulty in raising all the required funds -- which might make it a bit awkward not to approach them with a story that we are greatly worried about funds; (b) if we deceive them as to the true purpose of the letter which we ask them to sign, this might jeopardize the relationship of mutual trust and confidence thus far existing between them and us -- especially since they will most likely become aware of our induced "The exact approach to be chosen should therefore be carefully reconsidered.

4. Method "b" might be carried out either by (I) suggesting to CALLIGERIS that he hands the letter to AVILA, together with specific instructions as to whom to contact and whom not to contact (see also my comments on [] recommendation re AVILA); possibly he should give only one copy of the letter to AVILA and give another original (or several originals?) to us; or by (II) our selecting a suitable person, whether a contract agent of U.S. nationality or an agent of foreign nationality (perhaps an English-speaking Guatemalan in exile), to make the desired contacts with the purported "backers"; if this is to be a leak, the question is whether we could not find such a man among the agents close to either ERRATIC or LIBETHINITE IV (but this might involve the danger that he would leak more than we want him to): I am not in a position to recommend a specific person at the moment.

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5. Method "c" will vary according to whether we prefer that the letter reaches the enemy directly or, on the contrary, that information about the letter should come to the enemy by detours, for instance, by printing it in a newspaper. The main difficulty is that, the more care we take to make the loss of the letter appear "natural" the smaller are the chances that it will actually arrive at the intended destination. For the first alternative, we might either

- (I) have the letter directly shown to a suspected enemy agent (Villa toro??);
- (II) pass a copy by mail or communicate contents by telephone so that it is likely to be intercepted by enemy censorship (e.g. a communication from somebody posing as a disgusted follower of CALLIGERIS writing or phoning to a newspaper office in Guatemala City); or
- (III) communicate it "by mistake" to an enemy address: for instance, a man posing as a journalist, staying at a hotel in Texas (or in Mexico?), may address a letter with some innocent contents to the Soviet Consulate in New York, or to [] or to any other address known to be connected with enemy intelligence; the legitimate contents of that letter would require an attachment (e.g. a questionnaire on Soviet purchasing plans of U.S. consumer goods or an itinerary for a trip through the Soviet Union, for which a visa is asked for, or the like). Actually, however, he would attach a photostat of the letter in question or, perhaps better, the draft of an article in which the letter is quoted; a few hours after posting the letter, the man would send a wire to the addressee (or call long distance), explaining that he had made a terrible mistake and put the wrong attachment in his letter, counting on the fairness and discretion of addressee and demanding immediate return of the compromising paper, forwarding at the same time, with a second air mail/special delivery letter the "correct" attachment.

6. If we choose the second alternative (publication), we might implement it in either of the following ways:

- (I) plant it directly - but in this case, we have to choose a publication which is not "tainted" with the suspicion of being influenced by the U.S. Government -- preferably a publication outside the U.S., perhaps somewhere in South America or even in France or Spain; President FIGUERES of COSTA RICA and his government-controlled press or the SOCIEDAD AMIGOS DE GUATEMALA (a Communist front) in MEXICO might be considered as fair prospects for such a leak, purportedly coming from a disgruntled follower of CALLIGERIS.
- (II) have an agent commit an "indiscretion" in talking to a suitably chosen newspaper man who can be expected to give the story a sufficient build-up (Drew Pearson?);
- (III) mail it to a newspaper "by mistake", as suggested in paragraph 5/(III) above

7. Whichever way we choose, we must make sure that the leak does not become identifiable as such. At the very least, we ought to use a photostat of the letter, better a "copy of a copy" or perhaps only notes paraphrasing the actual letter (which might be shown to some of the people to be deceived, but not left with them for actual publication).

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8. Whatever may be decided along the above lines, I submit that such action will be hardly sufficient to achieve completely the desired deception and cover effect. I therefore recommend that other types of deception, diverting suspicion altogether from the U.S. and shifting it to the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and/or Argentina, (or any other country not closely allied to the U.S.) should be undertaken in any case, too. I am told that [] has a close friend and devoted follower in Spain (a Guatemalan exile) who might be used for a diversion in that direction: [] [] can furnish more information on that latter point.

9. I have discussed the entire subject with Mr. [] as directed, and have revised the attached draft as well as the present memorandum after that discussion.

[]

C/PP

Attachment

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Moscow is rapidly expanding its beachhead in Guatemala into an active threat of aggression against the entire hemisphere. Guatemala offers not only a safe haven for communist fugitives from justice in other American countries, it interferes more and more boldly with the political and social situation in other Central and S American republics, fomenting strikes, training and arming communist-led guerrillas and using its consulates and legations as advanced command posts for subversive movements in half a dozen countries. At the same time, the Soviets are using Guatemala as a spearhead for economic infiltration, as indicated by calling a Latin American trade conference to be held in Moscow which the communist-controlled Labor Federation of Guatemala (CGTG) was the first to endorse.

On behalf of the organized anti-communist opposition in Guatemala, I am therefore addressing an urgent appeal for moral and material support to all anti-communist forces throughout the Americas. We have been fortunate enough in receiving already valuable aid from various sides, especially from business and official groups and personalities in Mexico, San Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela as well in the Dominican Republic and in Argentina. However, since the Communists in Guatemala have not only the entire resources of the government at their disposal, receive also lavish aid in money, personnel and arms directly from Moscow, more support is needed to eliminate this cancerous growth in the very heart of the Americas.

Time is of the essence: we consider therefore the "Inter-American Youth Rally" which the Communists plan to hold in Guatemala City next September, as the point of departure for the implementation of our plans. I urge you therefore not to hesitate and to give us your support, in whatever form you can, as soon as possible. I request that you receive the bearer of this letter, one of my most trusted assistants, so that he may explain to you those aspects of our plans which I do not dare to entrust to

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paper and that he may discuss with you practicable measures to help us in overthrowing the Arbenz-Soviet regime in Guatemala.